Our Role in God\u27s Rule: Lutheran and Mennonite Views on Moral Agency by Janzen, Waldemar & Huebner, Harry
Consensus
Volume 22
Issue 2 Essays Ecumenical and Historical Article 1
11-1-1996
Our Role in God's Rule: Lutheran and Mennonite
Views on Moral Agency
Waldemar Janzen
Harry Huebner
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus
This Articles is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Consensus by an
authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
Janzen, Waldemar and Huebner, Harry (1996) "Our Role in God's Rule: Lutheran and Mennonite Views on Moral Agency,"
Consensus: Vol. 22 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol22/iss2/1
Our Role In God’s Rule:
Lutheran And Mennonite Views
On Moral Agency
Waldemar Janzen and Harry Huebner
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Introduction
This article is a comparative study of Lutheran and Men-
nonite ethics, viewed from a Mennonite perspective. Instead of
engaging in a general survey we have focused attention on the
respective understandings of moral agency, believing this to be
the area of greatest ethical divergence between the two confes-
sions. In other words, we want to address primarily the ques-
tion of the Christian’s place and role in doing the will of God,
as understood by Lutherans and Mennonites, respectively.
A recent Lutheran-Mennonite dialogue in Germany con-
firms this choice of focus. ^ It identifies the areas of baptism and
ethics as those of greatest divergence between the two confes-
sions. Within the realm of ethics, the dialogue isolates the eth-
ical relevance of the humanity of Jesus {die ethische Relevanz
des Menschseins Jesu) as the central area of tension. Mennon-
ites have responded to the tension between the lofty teachings
and example of Jesus on the one hand, and the sinfulness of
the world on the other, with a call to imitatio, or immediate
discipleship {Ethik der unmittelharen Nachfolge). Luther, and
Lutherans after him, have consistently responded to that ten-
sion by way of the two kingdoms doctrine. In other words,
they have responded to the question “How does the Christian
act as the agent of God’s will?” with the prior question: “In
what context or office? Are we speaking of the Christian in
his or her private capacity, or of the Christian acting in a pub-
lic office, such as magistrate, prince, parent, teacher, etc.?” If
the former, then Luther also accepted the radical demands of
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discipleship as relevant; if the latter, he pointed to a differ-
ent mode of ethical agency, a mode relevant to the temporal
kingdom. We agree with this analysis of the locus of ethical
tensions between the two confessions.
One could possibly even sharpen the focus of these ethi-
cal tensions. For both Lutherans and Mennonites the starting
point in their ethical quest has been Scripture exclusively [sola
scriptura), but for both confessions one particular text, the Ser-
mon on the Mount, has functioned as the touchstone for ethics.
For Mennonites, this text has epitomized the call of Jesus to
a life of discipleship {Nachfolge, imitatio) distinct from this
world. For Luther, it was the struggle with the Sermon that
led to the development of his particular version of the two king-
doms doctrine. 2 In contrast to the Anabaptists/Mennonites,
however, he did not establish this scriptural text (and similar
lofty ethical demands elsewhere) as the touchstone for Chris-
tian behaviour. Instead, he struggled with the tension between
the Sermon (and similar texts) and such other texts of Scrip-
ture in both Testaments as Romans 13, 1 Peter 2:13-14, Gene-
sis 9:6, or Exodus 21:14, 22ff, texts that affirmed for Luther the
divine calling to a different ethic than that of the Sermon.^ The
result was his two kingdoms doctrine, a doctrine, to be sure,
that he also found to conform to the state of the world and to
human reason. If the understanding of the Sermon functioned
so centrally in setting divergent ethical tracks for Lutherans
and Mennonites, it might well become the starting point for
seeking a better understanding, if not full agreement. We will
therefore return to the Sermon and the respective understand-
ings of its claim below.
Unfortunately, these theological differences have seldom
been addressed in non-pejorative, non-maligning dialogue.
Instead, the interaction between the two confessions has,
throughout the centuries, been marked by mutual caricatur-
ing. It is necessary to address this impediment of caricaturing
first, before we can proceed to a search for convergence.
Luther himself characteristically referred to the Anabap-
tists (the forbears of the Mennonites) as “the enthusiasts” ( die
Schwdrmer). This points to their central characteristic, as
Luther perceived it: they lacked realism. They believed to
be possible and God-willed what was neither, namely the es-
tablishment on earth, through human efforts (“works”), of a
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pure society/church governed by the Sermon. As for the world
at large, the Anabaptists were either deluded into believing
that it could be governed by the same precepts in a legalistic
fashion, or—more often—they abandoned all responsibility for
it. It is painful for Mennonite readers that twentieth century
Lutheran theologians still use the condescending and pejorative
term “enthusiasts” (5c/iit;armer), not only when citing Luther
and older sources, but as an apparently adequate descriptive
term from their own perspective."^
For Anabaptists/Mennonites, on the other hand, Luther
has traditionally been the reformer who started well, but then
gave in to compromise. They heartily approved of his principle
of sola scriptura and of his emphasis on salvation by grace
through faith, but they perceived his two kingdoms doctrine
as a capitulation to the world. Unable to abandon the state
church ( Volkskirche) concept and the support of the princes,
he resorted to a dual ethic that—restricting true discipleship
to the Christian’s individual and private sphere—left society
to run according to its own inherent laws. Gospel became
synonymous with cheap grace for the individual, while secular
reason and law prevailed in society.
Every caricature contains some truth. It is a moot ques-
tion for our purposes to attempt to decide to what degree
the caricatures presented do in fact reveal dangers inherent
in the respective positions, and to what extent they simply
misrepresent the confessions to which they are attributed. For
a fruitful dialogue, each side must strive anew for a truer un-
derstanding of the other. Each must also realize that there
is extensive inner-confessional variance and discussion in each
group, and that sixteenth century positions—whether true or
caricatured—have to be heard as they are understood by their
contemporary heirs. Only then can there be a fruitful common
search for the greater truth.
A first step in this direction, and in the pursuit of the task
of this paper, is for us as Mennonite authors to respond to
“Lutheran questions” as we understand them, with contempo-
rary Mennonite thinking. To do so, we must begin by mak-
ing explicit our best understanding of the relevant points of
Lutheran theology. It should be clear that neither of us (the
authors of this article) is a Luther-scholar, and that the fol-
lowing summary of Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine is offered
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merely to clarify the assumptions on which our Mennonite re-
sponses rest.
Two Kingdoms Theology Revisited
Luther’s Doctrine: We referred already to the tension per-
ceived by Luther between the Sermon on the Mount on the
one hand, and other Scripture passages calling to a different,
less radical ethic. He rejected resolutely the medieval Catholic
notion of a dual ethic, in which a higher morality was expected
of the clergy and monastics, while a lower ethic sufficed for or-
dinary Christians. He insisted that the Sermon is incumbent
on every Christian, but only in the personal sphere. As an in-
dividual, the Christian is to practice radical love of neighbour,
radical self-denial, and the readiness to suffer in consequence.
Such are the marks of citizenship in the spiritual kingdom.
For the public realm, Luther preserved the Sermon’s call to
love, but saw the mode of its implementation to be indirect
(doing God’s “strange work”). There, to love means to secure
order, extend protection, and advance each sphere of life, each
“station” or “office”, according to its own inherent principles.
To love in one’s office or station as parent, for example, might
mean to punish a child; to love as a magistrate or prince might
mean to execute a criminal or wage war. To act thus as a citizen
of the temporal kingdom is not to act outside of God’s will,
but rather according to the law of God as graciously granted
to preserve order in the world during the present aeon. The
Christian has to discern at all times whether he or she, in a
given matter, ought to act as citizen of the one or the other
kingdom. In either case, however, such a Christian would be
acting as the agent of God’s will. Both kingdoms, or better
perhaps, both governments,^ are agencies of God in the fight
against the kingdom of Satan.
Luther’s view of the Christian acting in the two kingdoms
could be illustrated as follows [see next page].^ Note, for ex-
ample, that “the Christian” is under both the temporal and
spiritual authorities. This is justified on the basis that both
are, after all, under the ultimate authority of God.
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Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine has received varying inter-
pretations and considerable critique from within and without
Lutheran circles. We can refer only to a few points in this dis-
cussion, points that have special significance for a Mennonite
response. Helmut Thielicke'^ lists three “dangers” contained in
Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine: First, the danger of a double
morality. On Luther’s model, the Christian is called to contra-
dictory modes of action, depending on whether he or she acts
as a private person or within an office. Second, the danger
of understanding the “world” as “a web of autonomous laws”
{ein Gewehe von Eigengesetzlichkeiten)
.
The public realm, it
is said, is withdrawn from the claim of Christ’s lordship and
from Christian moral accountability. This critique was upheld,
among others, by Karl Barth, but also by Roman Catholic
critics. Third, the danger of seeing the two kingdoms in a
static and harmonious side-by-side existence rather than in
a sequence of aeons in which the old aeon (the kingdom of
the “world”—“world” here means “fallen world”) is constantly
challenged by the new (the kingdom of God). Thus the radi-
cality of the demands of the Sermon on the Mount is swallowed
up in the harmony of two orders of creation, distinct from each
other but equally willed by God.
As we said already, Thielicke acknowledges all three criti-
cisms as real “dangers” in Luther and Lutheranism. He clears
Luther himself of the first charge, admitting its justification
with respect to some later Lutheran theologians. As to the
second charge, he concedes to a high level of liability within
Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine but provides an alternative in-
terpretation that, he believes, can avert the danger.^ Regarding
the third charge, however, Thielicke admits to a basic defect
in Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine.^
To characterize this defect, Thielicke returns to Luther’s
understanding of the Sermon on the Mount. Here, at the root
of Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine, he discovers a onesided-
ness, or better, a critical deficiency. The Sermon, for Luther,
is certainly meant to infuse the principle of love even into
the realm of the temporal kingdom. There, its application
takes on a particular mode, as explained already, serving to en-
courage good government, good parenting, etc., if Christians
fulfil their offices properly. But does not the Sermon, asks
Thielicke, fulfil a second function, according to the New Tes-
tament, namely that of “putting in question the whole present
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aeon” {die. . .Infragestellung dieses ganzen Aeons)? Having
lived through the Hitler-era, Thielicke knows that the secu-
lar powers, even though they keep order as Luther expected
of them, are by no means only upholders of God’s orders em-
bedded in creation; they are also very much the expressions
of the fallenness of the present aeon. Thielicke can formulate
this defect in Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine tersely as “the
atrophy of the eschatological dimension” {der Schwund des es-
chatologischen Moments)^ or simply as the “de-eschatologizing
of the Sermon on the Mount” {die Enteschatologisierung der
Bergpredigt)A^
We have not presented this third point in Thielicke’s cri-
tique of Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine because it is in it-
self more weighty or more generally acknowledged than other
criticisms of that doctrine, but because it brings a promi-
nent Lutheran theologian in the second half of the twenti-
eth century to a position that comes very close to an An-
abaptist/Mennonite perspective. If Lutherans can think such
thoughts, a convergence with Anabaptist/Mennonite theology
on at least some aspects of Christian ethical agency seems
clearly possible. Before we return to this point, however, we
must now present the Anabaptist views of Christian moral
agency, views also based on the two kingdoms doctrine, but
locating the Christian differently within it.
The Anabaptists’ Doctrine: The Anabaptists of the six-
teenth century were by no means a homogeneous group. There
has been much debate in recent times as to who should be in-
cluded under that name. Those referred to here as Anabap-
tists will represent, unless otherwise indicated, those “owned”
by later Mennonites as their forbears. Although these also
held to divergent positions on many points, they were gener-
ally marked by insistence on adult baptism, a separated church
based on voluntary membership, strict church discipline with
emphasis on separation from the world, exercising of the ban as
a means of church discipline, refusal to swear an oath, refusal
to bear arms, and refusal to hold government office. The last
two points are particularly significant for our further reflection.
It is often said, and not without some justification, that
these Anabaptists did not develop a coherent theological po-
sition; that they, instead, placed all emphasis on obedience
to the lofty commands of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount
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and elsewhere as they understood these from the perspective
of “simple biblicists”. Whatever truth this characterization
may contain, it is also true that their writings show a consid-
erable consistency on a number of points, including the role of
Christians as moral agents.
The Anabaptists as defined did have their own two king-
doms doctrine, of which no less an authority than Walter
Klaassen can say, “In its basic ingredients it was virtually iden-
tical to Martin Luther’s.” He proceeds to characterize the two
kingdoms as follows: “The kingdom of Christ was characterized
by peace, forgiveness, non-violence, and patience. The king-
dom of the world, or Satan, was strife, vengeance, anger, and
the sword which kills. Government belonged to this kingdom
of the world.” While Klaassen’s characterization of the king-
dom of Christ agrees indeed with Luther’s, that of the second
kingdom appears to be very different. For Luther, the worldly
kingdom was, as we have seen, one of the two regiments of God
through which God, albeit by way of law rather than gospel,
does battle against the kingdom of Satan. And yet, Klaassen
is not altogether wrong. The question is, “How did the An-
abaptists regard the ‘world’?” Was it, for them, identical with
the realm belonging to Satan, or did the Anabaptists conceive
of the “world” in some manner closer to Luther, in spite of the
power of Satan manifest in it?
The latter is a distinct possibility. This emerges from the
fact that the Anabaptists, like Luther, consistently referred
to government as instituted by God to protect the just and
restrain the wicked (Romans 13). They affirmed their own duty
to be obedient to government, except where its demands violate
God’s will as found in Scripture. How then can government
belong to the kingdom of Satan, as Klaassen claims and as
many quotations from Anabaptist sources verify, and yet be of
God and require rightfully that Christians submit to it? Some
Anabaptists may simply have lived with this paradox. Others,
it appears, resolved it by emphasizing the Fall (Genesis 3). God
had given violent governments to a fallen world as judgment
over it. In ancient Israel, already, kingship was permitted by
God both as grace and judgment, but government after Christ
could only be seen “as a symbol of man’s persistent rebellion
against the lordship of Christ”. Christians, though forgiven,
have to submit to it as a form of God’s judgment.
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A more generally applicable and more adequate account of
the Anabaptists’ view of the world appears to us to lie else-
where, however. The starting point is Christ’s call to disci-
pleship (Nachfolge). For the Anabaptists, this meant not only
accepting of forgiveness and the promise of eternal salvation,
but also the call to separate themselves from the “world” by
becoming an alternative society, the church or the kingdom of
Christ. This kingdom is marked by a new order of living to-
gether, an order preeminently characterized by the Sermon on
the Mount. Life in this kingdom is a truly transformed life,
not by human effort (“works”), but by the power of the Spirit.
Although the Anabaptists really and seriously strove to live
a new life, and although they loved to speak of “the church
without spot and wrinkle”, they were well aware of the fact
that the kingdom of Christ could be lived out in this world
only in a preliminary, less than perfect form. Its perfection
would be reached only in the eschatological coming of God’s
rule.l^ One clear indication of this belief is the provision for
disciplining erring members by means of the ban, a provision
that would make no sense if perfection in the present church
were assumed. In sum, citizens of the kingdom of Christ are
those who, through redemption by Christ’s atoning sacrifice,
have been empowered by the Spirit to enter into discipleship of
Christ. Such discipleship is not an individual matter only, but
a communal one. Robert Friedmann points out that, in con-
trast to the separation from the world sought in later Pietism,
Anabaptists understood themselves to be called into the king-
dom of Christ in which “the brother is constitutive to the idea
of the kingdom”.
Where does this leave the “world”? The Anabaptists would
have said, “In the clutches of Satan”, and in that sense consti-
tuting the kingdom of Satan. It is so only for now, however.
Satan’s present power over the world is constantly subject to
the onslaught of the kingdom of God/Christ; in other words,
it is redeemable, just like the individual. But to be redeemed
also means the same subjection to the rule of Christ as it does
for individuals. In other words, a redeemed government would
be one using the “sword of the Spirit” as its only weapon.
Is it practically possible, however, for governments as we
know them to be redeemed in this sense? In all likelihood,
no. Many Anabaptists therefore considered it improper for
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Christians to hold government offices. Others, however, al-
lowed that Christians, if elected, should accept such offices,
but exercise them according to the law of Christ. That would
undoubtedly insure a short tenure, a fact that itself would be
a witness to the fallenness of the world. Key to our un-
derstanding of the Anabaptists in this matter is the phrase
“governments as we know them’\ In it lies the presupposition
that the orders of the world, more or less as they have ex-
isted throughout much of history, must be preserved, and that
any theology that does not ensure their preservation is utopian
(that of Schwdrmer). It is precisely this assumption which the
Anabaptists, believing themselves to follow Christ, challenged
radically.
This challenge has often exposed them to the accusation
that they wanted to rule the world by the Sermon on the
Mount. Far from it. They knew clearly that the “world” as
we know it is incompatible with—though not unredeemable
by—the rule of Christ. To the extent that the world contin-
ues unredeemed, it will be governed by the law (Luther) that
God has decreed for an unredeemed world. Christians, being a
part of that present aeon, have to submit to that law. To the
extent that they have become signs of the coming aeon, how-
ever, they will not need to be restrained by that law. To that
extent they witness to a new and coming kingdom. They did
not share “Luther’s eschatological reservation in applying to
the old world kingdom norms that were intended for the new
‘world” ’,20 a reservation critiqued by Thielicke, as we noted
above.
Representatives of mainline Protestantism tend to come
back at this point to questions like: “But what if everyone be-
lieved like them?” “Who would administer society as we know
it and preserve its limited good?” The Anabaptist answer here
is one of faith: God. God will use human instruments, who may
not be aware of it, just as God used Nebukadnezzar or Cyrus
in Old Testament times. The Christian’s calling, however, is
not to maintain the kingdom of the world, but to witness to
the coming kingdom of God by establishing signs of it in the
form of an embodied different social order. This position has
been interpreted as a rejection of responsibility for society. The
Anabaptists considered it to be the opposite; to extend to so-
ciety what it needs most. A somewhat caricaturing analogy
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may help: Who shows greater responsibility for an alcoholic,
the one who provides him with alcohol so that he can main-
tain his status, or the one who calls him to abstinence? The
Anabaptists opted for the latter.
The Anabaptists’ view of the Christian acting in the two
kingdoms could perhaps be illustrated as follows, [see below]
Note that “the Christian” is wholly under the spiritual au-
thority and never under the temporal authority alone. This is
because the Anabaptists believed that Christ had inaugurated
a new rule which was a sign of the parousia. And Christians
were invited to embody that rule. This did not mean that
the Anabaptists saw themselves as having no dealings in the
physical realm, but even in that realm they were under the
authority and rule of Christ.
GOD
(Kingdom of God)
/
(hidden God) (mealed God)
Creation Jesus Christ
(state, business^ family) (sermon, faith, chw^ch)
Temporal Auihoritv Spiritual Authority
— (The Christian)
Physical Realm Spiritual Realm
/
(Kingdom of evil)
THE DEVIL
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We conclude this section with a non-theological reflection.
It is more widely recognized today than it was in the sixteenth
century that theology is not, or not first of all, that which
shapes religious reality, but often the reflection that follows
such reality and attempts to clarify it. If we apply this insight
to the debates of the Reformation era, it might help us to see
that both Luther and the Anabaptists often spoke and acted
from more deep-seated and less articulated wellsprings than
their theologies evidenced. For Luther, and many others then
and later, the need for order and ongoing stability of society
seems to have been axiomatic. Since the Anabaptists rejected
much that seemed necessary for the maintenance of such order,
they were called “enthusiasts” /5c/iwdVmer. The Anabaptists,
on the other hand, drew on a deep-seated, axiomatic conviction
that the world as it is stands in stark contrast to God’s will as
revealed in Jesus Christ, and that the most urgent calling and
the most authentic form of responsibility for the world is to
witness to the true will of God. If everyone would accept that
witness, the present order would indeed be “in trouble”. But
ought it to be preserved at all cost? Is it not in deep enough
trouble already, in spite of all exercise of “love” by means of
the sword?
The Social Form of the Church: A Backward Glance
In addition to the psychological point just made, one should
note that the dispute about the social form of the church is,
of course, as old as the church itself. And the reason for the
difference between Luther and the Anabaptists on this point
had partly to do with how they positioned themselves in the
larger story of the church. Luther, a monk in the Augustinian
order, was in effect giving a much needed Augustinian critique
of late medieval theology and life. The Anabaptists, on the
other hand, while accepting this critique, thought it necessary
to correct Luther’s proposals in a manner somewhat reminis-
cent of the monastics’ response to Augustine. One cannot sim-
ply make the claim, as the Luther scholar Heiko Oberman has,
that “the new layman is the old monk” 21 and yet it is also
not entirely false. To explain this requires a brief historical
digression.
Augustine’s intense struggle with and eventual rejection of
Manichaean dualism, pushed him to speak about the Christian
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life in a new way. Since evil had only a negative reality (it was
the absence of good), he felt compelled to explain its origins in
terms of the human will. J. Philip Wogaman puts it this way,
To Augustine, there is no evil outside the will. . .Augustine, thus,
grounds Christian ethics in the moral will, not in the goodness or
evil of objects outside the will. The will is good or bad in accordance
with what it worships and loves. A will directed by its love for God
is good, while a will directed by love of self and lesser goods is
evil—even though these lesser goods are not, in themselves, evil.^^
This is why for Augustine humility (openness beyond self)
is good and pride (love of self) is the core of all evil. In other
words, a good will is a will directed to God; a bad will is a
will directed away from God. This allowed Augustine to say,
dilige, et quod vis fac (“Love and do what you will”). 23
Augustine’s discussion of the will is important for Christian
ethics. At first blush one wonders whether he really means
that evil stems only from a bad will and nothing else. Is it
not proper to enquire what causes the will to be bad? Can
the will’s being badly trained or misinformed not be the cause
of it acting badly? For Augustine, apparently not! Speaking
about wicked people, he says: “If the further question be asked.
What was the efficient cause of their evil will? there is none.
For what is it which makes the will bad, when it is the will
itself which makes the action bad? And consequently the bad
will is the cause of the bad action, but nothing is the efficient
cause of the bad will.” 24
This way of speaking about why people do good and bad
things has two important consequences: First, it leaves little
role for the virtues in Christian ethics because the main job
of the virtues is to train the will to perform good acts; and
second, it drives a wedge between the internal (will) and the
external (act) in a way that depreciates the moral relevance
of the latter. It is now possible to do something that has the
external appearances of evil (e.g., killing, lying, stealing) and
justify it in reference to an acceptable inner disposition such as
love. That is, inner invisible factors (feelings, attitudes) alone
justify our actions. A similar way of thinking also informs
Augustine’s view of the church. Since the authenticity of a
Christian can only be determined internally, and hence by God,
the true community of Christians (the church) is not publicly
visible. Hence there can be no specified social form of the
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true church. That church cannot exist as a moral community
capable of moral agency.
It is precisely this inner/outer distinction resulting in the
impossibility of the church to function as moral community
which the monastic tradition, especially the coenobites, found
unacceptable. And in so doing, they felt compelled to form
a counter community based upon discipleship training and re-
nunciation of the world. They did not reject the distinction
between the inner and the outer; they merely found the incon-
gruity intolerable. Take for example, St. Benedict (ca. 480-
550), who left the university at Rome, “distressed by the de-
bauched life of his fellow students”. 25 Instead he started an
alternative monastic community where renunciation, separa-
tion and discipline were the watchwords. For him the outer
act was far from morally irrelevant for the Christian. In fact
the whole point of the Christian life is the harmony of the inner
and the outer—love of God and love of neighbour. 26 The point
of the Christian community was to be an alternative. Benedict
explicitly emphasizes the unity of the internal and the exter-
nal in his elaboration of the twelve steps of humility. He says,
“The twelfth step in humility is if a monk not only be humble
in heart, but also always in his very body evince humility to
those who see him.” 27
It is through the Thomistic synthesis that the Augustinian
dualisms of inner/outer and will/action are normally thought
to come together. 2S Thomas believed that the doctrine of di-
vine creation implied that everything is created for a specific
purpose or end (telos). Since this is so, whether something is
good or not is determined by whether it fulfils its telos. This
is so in spite of original sin. Sin only requires that the way of
knowing telos and our way of attaining it must include divine
revelation and grace. The object of our knowledge and ac-
tion has not changed. He puts it thus: “Now there is but one
supreme good, namely God. . . Therefore all things are directed
to the highest good, namely God, as their end. . . .Therefore the
supreme good, namely God, is the cause of goodness in all
things good. Therefore he is the cause of every end being an
end, since whatever is an end is such in so far as it is good.” 29
This is not the place to expound the details of Thomism,
yet for understanding issues of Christian ethics relating to the
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Reformation it is important to state briefly especially two dif-
ferences between Augustine and Thomas. First, regarding the
human will. Augustine's view of the autonomy of the will is
flatly rejected by Thomas. Will does not determine act and
being, but being and the virtues determine act and will. For
example, the telos of human beings—happiness [eudaemonia)
^
which Thomas says consists in “contemplating God” or alter-
natively, “the contemplation of the truth”—cannot be realized
simply through the act of willing. It requires careful training
(by practicing the “theological virtues” of faith, hope and love)
in order to become who we truly are (being). This relates to the
second difference. For Augustine the human being is seen in
his/her individuality before (an angry) God and not in his/her
social and political context. For Thomas, the individual cannot
be conceived of apart from the polis which alone sustains life.
This gives the church the moral signiflcance of shaping human
beings into good people which it could not have for Augustine.
Luther saw this “moral significance” as a very dangerous
function of the church. And in part he was right. The church
cannot make anyone good (justified) before God. We are justi-
fied by God’s grace alone. Yet it is the teaching of the church
and the structuring of a life of response to God’s graciousness
that alone can sustain even the biblical teaching on justification
by grace through faith. The world around us knows nothing
about this concept. It literally screams “by your works you
are saved”. To put the tension between Thomas and Luther
differently, Thomas could not imagine the sustainability of the
I
Christian faith without an emphasis upon a well defined tra-
:
dition which would ensure that the church would not be swept
i up with the winds of popular heretical beliefs, while Luther
I
saw primarily the evils of a corrupt Christian tradition. And
! in part they are both right.
The Anabaptists were to Luther what the monastic move-
ment (and to some extent, Thomas) was to Augustine. They
I
could not accept the notion of the invisible (and therefore non-
ethical) form of the church. Being Christian required renuncia-
tion and separation, because it required the visible integration
II
of the external (act) and the internal (will). However, while
I
the monastic tradition could not be for all Christians, primar-
I
ily because of its insistence on voluntary poverty and celibacy
j
(it literally had no future), the Anabaptists believed that all
!
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Christians should live as they did (that is, they believed that
they were the future of the church). The church ought not to
consist of both the faithful ones as well as the “less faithful”
,
as Medieval Catholicism had taught, nor could it sometimes
follow Christ and at other times “follow the prince” as the
Lutherans were teaching. The church was to be the eschato-
logical community, the symbol of that reality which is God-
willed for the entire world. Its refusal to obey non-Christian
authorities when in conflict with the rule of Christ was not
rooted in a belief that such a way of life would justify it before
God; rather, this was simply the way of life that flowed from
justified people. That is, the internal was externally visible.
The church as sign was thought to be an act of God in the
world.
The Anabaptists therefore were never happy to be labelled
by what has come to be called “sectarianism”. They rejected
the response by both the Catholics and the mainline reformers
that they were a threat to the stability of society because they
refused to participate in certain “essential functions of society”
,
like the military and other state sponsored violent vocations.
On the other hand, they also rejected the notion that their “act
as sign” was socially irrelevant. They understood themselves
prophetically. They saw their relevance in their testimony to
an alternative witness. The central issue between them and
both the Catholics and the mainline reformers was the matter
of how Christians participate in the saving work of God in this
world.
An Alternative Paradigm: The Act of the Church is
its Being
Thomas Miintzer can serve as a fulcrum over which we can
clarify the matter of moral agency. Mainline reformers gener-
ally, and Lutherans particularly, have often associated the An-
abaptists with Thomas Miintzer, and hence have charged them
with attempting to establish the kingdom of God on earth. Yet
it is important to notice that the “real” Anabaptists along with
the Lutherans have rejected the political theology of Miintzer,
albeit, the rejections are rooted in quite different theological
assumptions. 32
Historical Case Study: Miintzer and his followers had
thought it a God-inspired cause to overthrow the oppressive
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political and economic order. Violent revolution was seen as
an appropriate way for Christians to participate in God’s rule.
Since the “establishment of the kingdom of peace and jus-
tice” was God-willed, it was assumed that any means of bring-
ing the kingdom of God to fruition was likewise God-willed.
The Lutheran discomfort with this type of political theology is
rooted in Luther’s own response to the peasants’ revolt: “Thus,
anyone who is killed on the side of the rulers may be a true
martyr in the eyes of God. . .On the other hand, anyone who per-
ishes on the peasant’s side is an eternal firebrand of hell. . .These
are strange times, when a prince can win heaven with blood-
shed better than other men with prayer!” Luther and his fol-
lowers believed that Miintzer’s political theology represented
a confusion of the spiritual and the temporal realms.
individual Christian one should not kill; as a citizen of the
state one ought to do what the state demands. Hence on both
counts one cannot rebel against the state. The Mennonite
discomfort with Miintzer’s political theology has an entirely
different base. Its-antecedents lie in the Swiss Brethren admo-
nition to Miintzer: “. . .we beg and admonish thee as a brother
by the name, the power, the word, the spirit, and the salva-
tion, which has come to all Christians through Jesus Christ our
Master and Saviour, that thou wilt take heed to preach only
the divine word without fear. ..Go forward with the word and
establish a Christian church with the help of Christ and his
rule. . .establish and teach only the clear word and practices of
God, with the rule of Christ.” ^5 The Swiss Brethren and their
followers believed that true Christians were called to be the
kind of people who evidenced salvation by living according to
the rule of Christ, both as private Christians and as citizens.
This included loving your enemies. Hence Christians could not
be engaged in violent revolutions such as Miintzer’s.
Perhaps it is helpful to schematize the three models of moral
agency highlighted by the Miintzer story. First, since Luther
believed that God brought about the kingdom through both
the temporal and the spiritual realms, it was the Christian’s
task to participate in both as agents of the kingdom of God.
This put Luther at odds with Miintzer and the Swiss Brethren
who rejected the government’s direct agential role in the es-
tablishment of God’s kingdom. Second, Miintzer believed that
the kingdom was to be brought about only by God’s faithful.
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for they alone knew its nature. Moreover, this had to take
place over against the government since it (the government)
was outside the perfection of Christ and rejected God’s lord-
ship. Such a political theology legitimated revolt against the
state. And third, the majority of the Anabaptists/Mennonites
agreed with the Swiss Brethren in arguing that the Christian’s
role is not to take charge of ruling the world. We are called to
have a part in this rule, namely, to bear witness to the rule of
Christ. We are not to impose the kingdom of God on the world
as Miintzer attempted nor are we to give the temporal author-
ities allegiance when in conflict with the spiritual authorities
as Luther suggested.
This three-way distinction regarding our role in God’s rule
has important implications for understanding the social form
of the Christian life. For example, it means that Mennonites
cannot answer the question which they are often asked, namely
“How will bearing witness to the rule of Christ solve the large
problems of the world?” The reason we cannot answer this
question is because we do not think that it is ours to answer.
Our agency in establishing the kingdom is a “partnership-with-
God-as-maj or-actor” agency. In fact, we believe that it is ex-
actly the assumption that this question requires an answer by
us that misrepresents the biblical (Christian) view of moral
agency. The compulsion to answer this question assumes that
we know more than we in fact do, and that we have more
power than we in fact have. Hence, this question is not central
in determining how we ought to live as Christians. Tradition-
ally the problem has been that our self-confessed inability to
answer this question has been misconstrued to rest in a lack
of concern for the world. But this is quite false. The political
theology expressed here is not a withdrawal ethic. Rather it
is an affirmation of the faith that transformation, even of soci-
ety, is grounded in God’s grace and not fundamentally in our
works.
Contemporary Theological Reflections: Mennonites are still
alternately accused of either withdrawal from society’s woes,
in order to be a pure community unto itself (sectarianism), or
of believing that they have an especially effective technique
—
non-violence—which can cure all of society’s ills (ruling the
world by the Sermon on the Mount). Although both views
may well be represented among us, neither, according to the
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authors of this essay, is promising Mennonite (or biblical)
theology. We believe that proper theological ethics arises from
the biblical faith that all of life under the reign of God is life
understood as gift (grace). Hence, we believe that the relation-
ship between all our actions and the rule of God is gratia^ and
not causa. At this point we believe we are, ironically, more
Lutheran than Luther. Luther was right in his teaching that
salvation comes by the grace of God; he just was not consistent
in its application to both the personal and the social aspects
of life. We notice, for example, that biblical stories such as the
Exodus story, the Gideon story, the conquest story, the cross-
resurrection story, all teach us that sola gratia applies not only
to personal salvation but also to social salvation. That is, just
as our “works” do not merit our own salvation, so they do not
produce God’s kingdom. Christian pacifism is therefore incor-
rectly understood either as a clever tool to defuse violence or as
an irresponsible reply to evil. The practice of Christian paci-
fism is a sign that violence is sin; it is not the way to salvation.
Hence we see Christian participation in war (the belief that it
is necessary to kill our enemies for the sake of the kingdom of
God) as a form of works righteousness.
The list of contemporary Mennonite, as well as other schol-
ars who espouse this view of the Christian life, is growing.
John Howard Yoder is perhaps the foremost among the Men-
nonite writers. In his The Politics of Jesus he gives strong
biblical support for a similar model of understanding our par-
ticipation in God’s reign. One way he expresses the argument
is by suggesting that the relationship between the cross and
the resurrection is the model for expressing our role in God’s
rule. He says:
. . .the triumph of the right, although it is assured, is sure because
of the power of the resurrection and not because of any calculation
of causes and effects, nor because of the inherently greater strength
of the good guys. The relationship between the obedience of God’s
people and the triumph of God’s cause is not a relationship of cause
and effect but one of cross and resurrection.^^
When we inquire about the relationship between cross and
resurrection as the Bible tells the story, we notice that we again
get back to the blessing or grace of God. That is to say, nei-
ther Jesus’ faithful obedience nor his willingness to suffer death
produced the resurrection; the resurrection was a free gift from
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God. However, this does not make the faithfulness of Jesus ir-
relevant. That Jesus’ death was unearned is a very important
part of the story, at least according to the Apostle Paul. The
life, the cross and the resurrection of Jesus are an intertwined
event of God which is broken apart only at great peril. Hence,
unless we simultaneously acknowledge a place for the reality of
God’s blessing together with our feeble efforts at faithfulness,
it is something other than the biblical notion of moral agency.
While we have no handles on God’s blessings, God wants to
(has promised to) bless our work.
Hence the very act of being an alternative witness, symbol-
ically participating in enterprises that we know are from God
and therefore will neither perish nor fail, is a significant act
indeed. Yet it is an act of an unusual kind. It is what we have
already called an eschatological act. It is not eschatological in
that it is preoccupied with teachings about the second com-
ing of Christ. Rather it is grounded in the conviction that the
one who is to come has already profoundly come and is present
among us. Hence eschatological being at once points to all that
will pass away and all that will endure. It is both judgement
and promise. The embodied announcement of the presence of
God among us—already but not yet fully—is the task of the
church.
It is not our suggestion that the Mennonite church, through
the years, has been a faithful expression of the view of moral
agency articulated in this essay. In our adherence to pacifism
(insofar as we have adhered) we have not always known what
it was (theologically speaking) that we were doing. But we
have believed it to be the call of Christ, and therefore to be
of God. In our theological discussions with other confessions
we are forced to become more theologically self-conscious, not
in order that we may prove ourselves defensible, but in order
mutually to come to see the truth more clearly. In the final
analysis, we need to remember that the truth of the Gospel is
spoken of as a way: “I am the way, the truth and the life” (John
14:6)—the ongoing process of integrating theory and practice.
Conclusion
Mennonites are sometime accused of emphasizing disciple-
ship at the expense of worship and spirituality. These accusa-
tions are at times hard to deny. The model of moral agency
Moral Agency 27
proposed in this essay arises partly out of a felt need to accept
this criticism. The church of Jesus Christ is called to be that
body which submits itself to a life marked by an integration of
worship and practice. This integrated practice is the alterna-
tive paradigm of life in Christ. We are not the body of Christ
because we are sinless. Simul Justus et peccator (we are both
saved and sinner) is undeniably correct Christian theology. Sin
is everywhere, but the presence of God through Jesus Christ is
faithful and able to vanquish its power, both in our own lives
as well as in the world. To this assurance we are called to bear
witness.
The authors of this essay have worshipped in Lutheran
churches on regular Sunday mornings for a combined total of
over six years. We have learned much and have had rich expe-
riences in this ecclesial setting. We have also come to accept
much Lutheran theology; even some of its criticisms of our own
tradition. Some of our own convictions have been strength-
ened, namely that all knowledge of God comes from God; it
is not figured out on the basis of human wisdom, regardless
of how brilliant the scholar who endeavours the task. Hence
the stance of the theologian ought to be one of humility. We
heartily agree with Luther and Lutherans that the biggest chal-
lenge for theology specifically and the Christian life generally
is to let God be God.
However, while applauding this and other Lutheran em-
phases like sola gratia and sola scriptura^ we are nevertheless
convinced that the theological battle cry to let God be God im-
plies another, namely, to let the church be the church. Why?
Because for Christians belief in God implies a commitment
to walk with Jesus—literally embodying the way of Christ.
We believe that we cannot know God unless we follow Christ.
And therefore we find it impossible to accept that Christians
can justify their involvement in acts such as violence and killing
under certain circumstances. On this point our two confessions
have sadly remained at odds.
We invite our Lutheran readers to contemplate a modifica-
tion of Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine in two respects. The
first is to recognize that there is continuity between the in-
dividual Christian and the two or three gathered in Christ’s
name. Since, according to Luther, an individual Christian can
and should act as disciple of Christ and citizen of the spiritual
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kingdom, why should not two or three or more join together in
such citizenship? Why not, even if they farm or trade with each
other? In other words, cannot “temporal affairs
“,
when con-
ducted by Christians, remain—at least up to a point—within
the realm of the spiritual kingdom, as a witness to the world?
To grant this would by no means constitute an attempt to rule
the world by the Sermon on the Mount; it would, however,
strengthen the church’s corporate impact on society by way of
the gospel, rather than the law. The second modification is
in line with Thielicke’s critique of Luther presented above. It
involves the clearer recognition of the demonic in the tempo-
ral realm, and consequently the biblical call to the church to
offer—however imperfectly, and not as a meritorious “work”
—
an alternative paradigm of being human in community.
Luther himself once identified the matter of moral agency
as a basic problem for Christians:
Now, if I am ignorant of God’s works and power, I am ignorant of
God himself; and if I do not know God, I cannot worship, praise,
give thanks or serve Him, for I do not know how much I should
attribute to myself and how much to Him. We need, therefore, to
have in mind a clear-cut distinction between God’s power and ours,
and God’s work and ours, if we would live a Godly life.^^
This essay has attempted to show that Mennonites have
seen the work of Jesus Christ as a model for how to distinguish
between “God’s work and ours” . Yet we readily confess that it
has been a struggle holding together two basic elements of the
Christian faith
—
grace and good works. Since biblical times
these two components have tended to come apart, despite the
clarity of the biblical injunction to hold them together.
For by grace are you saved through faith, and this is not your own
doing; it is the gift of God—not the result of works, so that no one
may boast. For we are what he has made us, created in Christ Jesus
for good works, which God prepared before hand to be our way of
life (Ephesians 2: 9-10).
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